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Abstract 
 
This article describes the process of self-determination  and the creation of a 
territorial autonomy of the Gagauz people in the Republic of Moldova. It also 
analyses the situation in the autonomy after the change of government in 
Chisinau in 2009 and evaluates the current status of accommodation of the 
Gagauz’ interests in the country. Aspects of state-building and the influence of 
external actors are explored as well. Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri) is one of the first 
post-Soviet autonomies. Since its establishment in 1994, no violent conflict has 
taken place there. However, the Gagauz language and culture remain relatively 
unprotected, and incentives as well as support for the integration of the Gagauz 
are low. The article outlines the potential for future disputes between the 
central government and local authorities, due to continuous attempts to limit 
Gagauzia’s self-governance and conflicting interpretations of how the autonomy 
should work. Furthermore, struggles between Gagauz political leaders and other 
local realities hamper the successful realization of Gagauz Yeri.  
With respect to Moldova’s efforts to resolve the Transnistrian conflict and to 
integrate with the European Union, compromises and cooperation through an 
ongoing dialogue between the centre and autonomy are clearly due. Resolving 
the remaining stumbling  blocks could make Gagauzia a living, rather than 
symbolic autonomy.  
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Making or Breaking the Republic of Moldova? The 
Autonomy of Gagauzia  
Siegfried Wöber 
 
 
1. Introduction 
The Republic of Moldova
1  is frequently referred to as ‘Europe’s poorest 
country’, and mainly receives attention in connection with its unresolved 
Transnistria conflict. It is less often that the European public hears about its 
diverse population, positive multicultural experiences and multiple identities, 
originating from its geographic position as a borderland of Europe.  
The academic community has turned its attention to the country after it 
gained independence in 1991 and faced two secessionist confrontations. The 
stand-off with the Gagauz people in the south was resolved peacefully and 
gave birth to one of the first post-Soviet autonomies –  the Autonomous 
Territorial Unit (ATU) –  Gagauzia/Gagauz Yeri. The conflicts arising in the 
country at the end of the Soviet Union period – Moldovan versus Soviet or 
Russian nationalism –  were complemented by a coinciding historical 
difference – past association with Romania versus Russia – and an ideological 
divide – pro-Communists versus anti-Communists.
2 In the 1980s, the country, 
where minorities make up about 25 per cent of the population, seemed calm 
and far from conflict. Moldova had no history of widespread communal 
violence nor faced a situation where religious beliefs were separating ethnic 
minorities from the majority.
3 Furthermore, the percentage of inter-ethnic 
marriages was high, especially in urban settlements.
4  
In 1992, an armed conflict with Transnistria broke out and led to the de 
facto independence of the region on the left bank of the Dniester as well as 
of some exclaves – the city of Bender and its near-by localities on the west 
 
 
1   Concerning terminology, the author of this paper will use the labels ‘Moldova’ and ‘Moldovan’ to 
refer to the corresponding republic and its citizens respectively. The unrecognized state in eastern 
Moldova, the Dnestr Moldovan Republic (Republica Moldovenească Nistreană in Moldovan/Romanian, 
Приднестрoвская  Молдавская  Респyблика/Pridnestrovskaya  Moldavskaya  Respublika  in  Russian), 
will be referred to as ‘Transnistria’, and Găgăuzia/Gagauziya as ‘Gagauzia’, as is commonly done by 
international organizations like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 
2   Stuart J. Kaufmann, “Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War”, 
21(2) International Security (1996), 108–138, at 127.  
3   Charles King, “The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States”, in 53(4) 
World Politics (2001), 524–552, at 532. 
4   Vasile Dumbrava, Sprachkonflikt und Sprachbewusstsein in der Republik Moldova: Eine empirische 
Studie in gemischtethnischen Familien  [Language Conflict and Consciousness in the Republic of 
Moldova: An Empirical Study in Mixed Families] (Lang, Frankfurt am Main, 2004), 37. Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia 
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bank of the river.
5 While this conflict has not been resolved and continues to 
dominate the political discussion in the country, the outcome of the Gagauz’ 
struggle for self-determination was largely based on a peaceful process, as 
will be described in the subsequent sections.
6  
There exist different opinions about the implementation of the relatively 
unknown autonomy of Gagauzia and its success. This article aims to 
contribute to the discussion on how to solve conflicts of an ethnic nature and 
how to accommodate minorities through territorial autonomies by shedding 
further light on this part of the world and its current state of affairs, in 
particular after a new coalition came into power in 2009 in the Republic of 
Moldova. This change of government ended the reign of the Party of 
Communists of the Republic of Moldova (Party of Communists), and official 
Chisinau turned its foreign policy vector towards the West, with the European 
Union (EU) starting to play a more active role in the country. At the same 
time, the questions of national identity, how to organize the state and which 
geopolitical directions to take are on the daily agenda of this relatively 
young, democratizing state. The influence of the Russian Federation is still 
strong and one part of society – especially Russian-speakers – is very nostalgic 
about Soviet times and institutions. 
The following research questions are the focus of this article: 
•  Which aspects of the Gagauz Yeri autonomy work well or raise 
concerns? 
•  What is the current status of accommodation of Gagauz’ interests in 
Moldova and which factors influence this minority–state relationship? 
•  How does Gagauz Yeri contribute to Moldova’s state-building process? 
 
 
 
5   Jos Havermans, “Moldova: Peace Organizations Search for Lasting Settlement”, in Paul van 
Tongeren, Hans van de Veen and Juliette Verhoeven (eds.), Searching for Peace in Europe and 
Eurasia (Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 2002), 280–282. 
6   This article is based on the author’s master’s thesis “Making or Breaking the Republic of Moldova? 
The Case of the Autonomy of Gagauzia”, prepared as part of the Interdisciplinary Balkan Studies 
postgraduate master’s degree course of the University of Vienna (2011), and is complemented by 
follow-up research (2012). Interviews were conducted with more than 20 persons, including three 
(out of four) MPs from Gagauzia in the parliament, the Bashkan, the Speaker of the People’s 
Assembly, leaders of the two main political movements of the autonomy, experts in Chisinau – 
among them also persons who were already active in politics in the 1980s/1990s  –  as well as 
representatives of think tanks working on/with/in Gagauzia, civil society actors from the autonomy 
and experts of Gagauz history and culture. Other background talks involved diplomats and 
representatives of the EU and the OSCE. For a list of interview partners see the bibliography. Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia 
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2. Gagauzia: Determination within Moldova  
2.1. The Gagauz – Who Are They (Said to Be)? 
2.1.1. Historical and Cultural Overview 
There are 25 theses
7  about the origin of the Gagauz, who are Orthodox 
Christians with a Turkic language.
8 The two main hypotheses are based on a 
Turkic against a non-Turkic origin, but with insufficient historiographic 
evidence to confirm one version.
9 Differing explanations are known for the 
origins of their ethnonym, while certain facts tend to support a non-Turkic 
etymological root. The name itself was first mentioned in written sources in 
the eighteenth century.
10 
About 155,000 ethnic Gagauz live in the south of Moldova.
11 In 1989, about 
36,000 were registered in the Odessa oblast of Ukraine, and by 2012 a few 
representatives could also be found in Bulgaria, Greece and Romania.
12 
Figures in relation to those in Bulgaria vary greatly, but it is reported that the 
Gagauz that live there are aware of their ethnic background. The ones that 
migrated to Turkey in the first half of the twentieth century, as well as the 
ones living in Romania, are mostly assimilated.
13  The Gagauz language 
belongs to the southwest division of Turkic languages and is strongly 
influenced by Romanian and Russian, and increasingly the Turkish language.
14 
As Orthodox Christians, the Gagauz felt repression in the Ottoman Empire and 
probably started to leave Bulgaria. Some of them also used to refer to their 
group as ‘Christian Bulgarians’.
15 It is widely accepted that they migrated to 
the south of Moldova, then Bessarabia, in several waves starting in the 1780s. 
Together with Bulgarians, they finally settled in the steppes of the Budshak 
during the Russian–Turkish wars.
16 
 
 
7   Thomas Gassler, “Die Gagauzen: Eine mustergültige Minderheit” [The Gagauz: A Model Minority], 
Eurasisches Magazin, 2009, 11, at http://www.eurasischesmagazin.de/artikel/?artikelID=20091111. 
8   Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Hoover Press, Stanford, 
1999), 210. 
9   Astrid Menz, “The Gagauz”,  in  Ergun  Çağatay  and  Doğan  Kuban  (eds.),  The  Turkish-Speaking 
People: 2000 Years of Art and Culture from Inner Asia to the Balkans  (Prestel, Munich, 2006),  
371–383, at 373–374. 
10   Menz, “The Gagauz” …, 376. 
11   Gassler, “Die Gagauzen …”. 
12  Jeff  Chinn and Steven D. Roper, “Territorial Autonomy in Gagauzia”, 26(1) Nationalities Papers 
(1998), 87–101, at 87–88. 
13   Menz, “The Gagauz …”, 371; Stepan Mihailovitsh Topal (advisor to the Bashkan; elected president of 
the self-proclaimed Gagauz Soviet Socialist Republic; interviewed on 22 July 2011 in Comrat) also 
mentioned this in an expert talk, underlining the Gagauz’ fear of assimilation in Moldova. 
14   Ibid., 379–380; Ljubov Stepanovna Tshimpoesh (Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Moldova, 
head of the sector for Gagauz ethnology; 25 July 2011 – Chisinau) explained in an expert talk that 
there existed a southern dialect, which was closer to Turkish, and a central dialect, which had less 
common elements.  
15   Ibid., 375–379. 
16   King, The Moldovans …, 209–211. Unlike (most) other minorities in Moldova, they cannot appeal to a 
kin-state as a ‘protector’ abroad. Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia 
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During the Russian Empire, the Gagauz had a number of privileges, such as 
exemption from military service and taxes.
17 In 1906, the Russian Revolution 
reached the southern border of the empire, where the Republic of Comrat 
was soon established.
18 During the Romanian period, especially the second 
one after 1918, they were under pressure to assimilate, to resettle to 
Romania, as well as being obliged to do military service and to speak 
Romanian.
19 In 1944, Stalin sent thousands of them to labour camps.
20 About 
half of the Gagauz died in the post-war famine (1946–47); however, they did 
not associate this artificially created famine with Soviet policy about them.
21 
Under Soviet rule, modernization reached the Gagauz in the form of the 
collectivization and mechanization of agricultural production, and education 
was made available for all parts of the population. The Cyrillic alphabet was 
introduced in 1957;
22 from 1962 onwards education was conducted in Russian 
only.
23  
Between 1941 and 1989, the Gagauz made up 3.5 per cent to 4.9 per cent 
of the overall population of Moldova, ranging between 115,700 and 153,458 
people.
24 Only 4 per cent of Gagauz mentioned Moldovan (Romanian) as their 
second language in 2004, compared to 73 per cent considering themselves 
fluent in Russian.
25 The Soviet period thereby meant a wide Russification of 
this geographically isolated people.
26  
2.1.2. Identity Issues 
A study
27 about the Crimean Tatars and the (Moldovan) Gagauz shows that the 
pro-Russian and pro-Communist orientation among the Gagauz (in contrast to 
the Tatars, also Turkic people, that gained autonomy after the break-up of 
the Soviet Union) was formed by a number of historical experiences: 
discrimination and persecution because of being Orthodox Christians during 
the Ottoman Empire; mass migration to the Bessarabia region under the 
 
 
17   Menz, “The Gagauz” …, 378. 
18   N. N. Tufar, Комратская Республика. 1906 год. [The Republic of Comrat. Year 1906.] (Samisdat, 
Comrat, 2009). Expert Ivan Grec (historian, writer, former MP; 20 July 2011 – Chisinau) called this 
5-day entity a product of a social movement. 
19   Menz, “The Gagauz” …, 378. Ljubov Stepanovna Tshimpoesh said that probably every Gagauz heard 
bad stories about this time; the Romanians also treated the Moldovans badly, and there even 
existed a plan to terminate small nations. 
20   Stephen R. Bowers et al., “The Moldovan Confederation Conundrum”, in Issues of the Post-
Communist Transition: Structure, Culture, and Justice  (2001), 66, at 
http://works.bepress.com/stephen_bowers/19/. 
21   Ivan Katchanovski, “Small Nations but Great Differences: Political Orientations and Cultures of the 
Crimean Tatars and the Gagauz”, 57(6) Europe-Asia Studies (2005), 877–894, at 890. 
22   During a short cultural renaissance in the 1930s, the priest Mihail Ciachir put together the first 
dictionary of the language. 
23   Claus Neukirch, “Autonomy and Conflict Transformation: The Case of the Gagauz Territorial 
Autonomy in the Republic of Moldova”, in Gal Kinga (ed.),  Minority Governance in Europe 
(LGI/ECMI, Budapest, 2002), 105–123, at 106. 
24   William Crowther, “The Politics of Democratization in Postcommunist Moldova”, in Karen Dawish 
and Bruce Parrott (eds.),  Democratic Changes and Authoritarian Reactions in Russia, Ukraine, 
Belarus and Moldova (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997), 282–329, at 287.  
25   Dumbrava, Sprachkonflikt …, 29. 
26   King, The Moldovans …, 211–213. 
27   Ivan Katchanovski, “Small Nations but Great Differences …”, 877–894. Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia 
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Russian Czar; certain (negative) historical experiences in Romania;
28 and the 
Soviet Union (a mainly positive experience). Socialization in the family and 
religion played important roles in identity building as well; they helped to 
store historical memory, transfer political culture
29 and build the basis of an 
identity in the making.
30  In this process, the Gagauz did not choose 
polarization against Moldovans.
31 
Despite their Turkic language, and certain affinities towards official 
Turkey, as will be discussed later, Gagauz working in Turkey are generally 
perceived to be Christians and Russians.
32 Orthodoxy has also played a role in 
separating the Gagauz from a Turkish identity and keeping them under the 
influence of Russian culture.
33  The latter’s impact was especially strong 
during the Communist period as the Gagauz then witnessed cultural progress 
and economic development of their relatively poor region. This period also 
provided the basis for a national awakening and the Gagauz’ wish to take 
their people’s faith in their own hands.  
2.2. The Way to Gagauzian Self-Rule  
2.2.1. Gagauz Awakening 
In the 1980s, a Moldovan national movement came into being in the 
capital, and Gagauz intellectuals formed the basis of a cultural awakening in 
the south.
34 On the back of ethnic mobilization in the Gorbachev era,
35 in 
1989 a Gagauz cultural club was established in the region’s capital Comrat, 
soon turning itself into a political organization called Gagauz Halki (Gagauz 
people).
36  
 
 
28   For instance, Jerzy Hatlas and Marek Zyromski, Power, Administration and Ethnic Minorities: The 
Case Study of Gagauzian Autonomy (UAM, Poznan, 2008). While different perceptions about the 
Romanian period/s exist, the general narrative is a negative one in the Gagauz community. 
However, at the end of World War I, the Gagauz were first recognized as a separate ethnos by 
Romania. 
29   Ibid. 
30   Hülya Demirdirek, “The Painful Past Retold: Social Memory in Azerbaijan and Gagauzia”, paper 
presented at the conference ‘Postkommunismens Antropologi’, 12–14 April 1996, Institute of 
Anthropology, University of Copenhagen, at 
http://www.anthrobase.com/Txt/D/Demirdirek_H_01.htm.  Demirdirek also points out that there 
was no place called Gagauzia before and it turned into reality through “practice and narration”. 
31   Ibid., 4. 
32   Leyla J. Keough, “Globalizing ‘Postsocialism’: Mobile Mothers and Neoliberalism on the Margins of 
Europe”, 79(3) Anthropological Quarterly (2006), 431–461. 
33   Andrei Avram, Territorial Autonomy of the  Gagauz in the Republic of Moldova: A Case Study 
(Moldova-Institut, Leipzig, 2010), 9–10. He also outlines how the religious revival was coupled with 
Gagauz culture. 
34   Neukirch, “Autonomy and Conflict Transformation …”, 106. 
35   John A. Webster, Parliamentary Majorities and National Minorities: Moldova’s Accommodation of 
the Gagauz (dissertation at Oxford University, 2007), 33. He quotes a study that showed that out of 
40 mobilizing nationalities during this period, the Gagauz were the only ones without any form of 
ethno-territorial structure to support their demands. 
36   King, The Moldovans …, 215. For a detailed chronology on the Gagauz in Moldova from the 1980s, 
see Minorities at Risk, “The Gagauz in Moldova”, 16 July 2010, at 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/chronology.asp?groupId=35901.  Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia 
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The subsequent development of Gagauz nationalism and striving for self-
determination was based on the goal of a territorial solution, which should 
take place through either a legislative change or a unilateral declaration of 
autonomy.
37 The leaders of the self-determination movement connected the 
striving for autonomy to the controversy over the state language in order to 
receive wider support for their ideas. While they understood the Moldovan 
wish to strengthen their language as something similar to their own goals, the 
new 1989 Language Law (Law No 3465 dated 1 September 1989, “Functioning 
of Languages on the Territory of the Moldavian SSR”)  raised concern 
nevertheless. Demands by certain groups for a union of Moldova with 
neighbouring Romania further stirred fears in the non-Moldovan population.
38 
2.2.2. A Gagauz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
On 12 November 1989, an assembly in Comrat proclaimed a Gagauz 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, within the Moldovan Soviet Socialist 
Republic, a step that was condemned as unlawful by central authorities in 
Chisinau.
39 This move by the Gagauz was in reaction to weakening chances of 
receiving support for their demands for autonomy.
40  The confrontation 
continued in the following months, nearly leading to armed clashes, and the 
Gagauz were further alienated from the Moldovans.
41 
In another development, elections were organized and in October 1990 
Stepan Topal was elected as the chairman of the Gagauz Supreme Soviet. The 
setting up of this political structure further strengthened the already focused 
and clear demands around territorial autonomy.
42 The political strife of the 
Gagauz was also fostered by other actions of the government: in 1990, for 
instance, it officially endorsed a report calling them a national minority, 
rather than a people or a nation, and stating that their homeland was 
Bulgaria.
43  
2.2.3. Talks between Chisinau and Comrat  
When the Soviet Union dissolved at the end of 1991, the Gagauz limited their 
lobbying to authorities in Chisinau. Negotiations on the draft law “On the 
Statute of the Gagauz Self-administered Territory” within a bilateral 
 
 
37   Webster, Parliamentary Majorities …, 61–62.  
38   On 31 August 1989, the Republic’s Supreme Soviet passed a new version of the state language law 
that was clearly favourable to the Moldovan/Romanian-speaking majority. King, The Moldovans …, 
215; William Crowther, “The Politics of Democratization …, 292; Martha Brill Olcott, “The Soviet 
(Dis)Union”, 82 Foreign Policy (1991), 118–136. 
39   Neukirch, “Autonomy and Conflict Transformation …”, 107. 
40   Webster, Parliamentary Majorities …, 63. 
41   King, The Moldovans …, 70–71 and 216–217.  
42   Webster, Parliamentary Majorities …, 71–76. 
43   Hülya Demirdirek, “Living in the Present: The Gagauz in Moldova”, 178(1) The Anthropology of East 
Europe Review  (2000), at http://condor.depaul.edu/rrotenbe/aeer/aeer18_1.html,  67–71, at 68. 
Nikolai Telpiz (Deputy Head of the New Gagauzia public movement; 21 July 2011 – Comrat) recalled 
that the Gagauz wanted an international commission to acknowledge them as a ‘nation’, but 
Moldova was against it.  Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia 
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commission started in mid-1992.
44 During the following months the Gagauz 
were waiting for a continuation of the talks.
45 In 1992, the armed conflict in 
Transnistria broke out and led to the de facto independence of this region.
46 
Unlike the elites on the other side of the Dniester, the Gagauz had not 
desired a full separation from Moldova.
47  Contact with Chisinau did not 
completely break down but it took until 1994, when the centre-left Agrarian 
Democrats came into power, until things moved again in the  negotiation 
framework. President Mircea Snegur visited Comrat a few times before the 
parliamentary elections –  in which the pan-Romanians were ultimately 
defeated – and joined the new government in voicing support for some sort of 
autonomy for the Gagauz districts.
48  
The period between 1989 and 1994 could be thought non-productive, but in 
the end it was a prelude to the power-sharing agreement that followed.
49 The 
current elite in Comrat believe that external players also had an important 
role in relation to the inception of autonomy, especially the then President of 
Turkey, Suleyman Demirel, as well as the Russian military that intervened just 
in time to prevent bloodshed.
50 
2.3. Territorial Autonomy – The Birth of Gagauzia 
2.3.1. The Establishment of Gagauz Yeri  
After a series of consultations, also with experts of the Council of Europe 
(CoE),
51 and further debate, on 23 December 1994 the Moldovan parliament 
passed the Law on the Special Juridical Status of Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri) – 
“Autonomy Statute”. Two safeguarding measures were introduced: any 
changes to the law would require   
a three-fifth’s majority vote in the parliament in Chisinau, and any 
enactments infringing on the powers of Gagauzia should be annulled by the 
Moldovan Constitutional Court. On the same day, the parliament of Moldova 
also passed   
 
 
44   Nikolai Telpiz pointed out that about seven Gagauz sessions were held in the negotiation period, 
where up to 800 people discussed the progress and content of the negotiation process. 
45   Webster, Parliamentary Majorities …, 73. He points out that in his interviews with leading figures of 
the movement, all stressed that, “there was never any serious effort to establish an independent 
state”. 
46   Jos Havermans, “Moldova: Peace Organizations …”, 280–282. Ljubov Stepanovna Tshimpoesh 
explained that Gagauz also died on the Moldovan side in this conflict. 
47   King, The Moldovans, 216–217. 
48   Ibid., 217–218. 
49   Järve Priit, “Gagauzia and Moldova: Experiences in Power-Sharings”, in Marc Weller (ed.), Settling 
Self-Determination Disputes: Complex Power-Sharing in Theory and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff, 
Leiden, 2008), 307–343, at 311. Nikolai Telpiz, who was part of the commission on the Gagauz side, 
explained that this period saw a number of negotiation rounds. 
50   Ljubov Stepanovna Tshimpoesh as well as Mihail Macar Formuzal (Bashkan of Gagauzia, former 
mayor of Ciadur-Lunga; 21 July 2011 –  Comrat); see also Keiji Sato, “Mobilizing of Non-Titular 
Ethnicities during the Last Years of the Soviet Union: Gagauzia, Transnistria, and the Lithuanian 
Poles”, 26 Acta Slavica Iaponica (2009), 141–157, at 151, at http://hdl.handle.net/2115/39575.  
51   The role of the then OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Max van der Stoel, should be 
highlighted as well. See, e.g., Stefan Troebst, “A Tribute to Max van der Stoel”, 6 July 2012,   
at www.ecmi.de/about/about-ecmi/a-tribute-to-max-von-der-stoel/.  Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia 
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a resolution calling on the government to bring its own enactments into 
accord with the law.
52  
On 5 March 1995, a referendum was held in 36 localities where the Gagauz 
either comprised more than 50 per cent of the population or where one-third 
of the locals initiated it. This led to the current structure of Gagauzia, which 
is comprised of 3 towns and 29 villages, altogether covering 1,848 km
2. 
According to the latest census in 2004, Gagauz represent 82.1 per cent of the 
155,646 inhabitants of Gagauz Yeri, Bulgarians make up 5.1 per cent, 
Moldovans 4.8 per cent, Russians 3.8 per cent and Ukrainians 3.2 per cent.
53 
After the referendum, the original administrative infrastructure changed and 
the administration of this now dispersed ‘autonomous territory’ became 
difficult.
54 This also had an effect on the Taraclia district, which hosts the 
Bulgarian minority, as Bulgarian-dominated villages chose not to join the 
autonomy, except for the ethnically mixed village of Kirsovo.
55 On 28 May 
1995, Georgi Tabunshik was elected Gagauzia’s first official leader, and in 
August of the same year Moldova granted amnesty to Gagauz movement 
activists.
56  
2.3.2. Main Points and Criticism of the Autonomy Statute 
In Article 1, the Autonomy Statute defines Gagauz-Yeri as an autonomous 
territorial unit, with a special status as a form of self-determination, 
representing an integral part of the Republic of Moldova.
57 Paragraph 4 of the 
first Article also says that in the event of a change in the status of the 
Republic to be no longer an independent state, the people of Gagauzia have 
the right to external self-determination.
58  
Highly criticized by right-wing forces in the country, this point represented an 
important provision for the Gagauz whose collective memory of a united 
Romanian-Moldovan state was negative.
59 
The Gagauz-Yeri is headed by a Governor (Bashkan), who is elected for a 
four year-term; the same period exists for the legislative power, the Gagauz 
People’s Assembly (Halk Toplushu). It is made up of 35 deputies, whereas 
every village is represented in this gathering thanks to a specific election 
system. The Bashkan, who is directing the activity of the public 
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53   National Bureau of Statistics of the Republic of Moldova, Population by Main Nationalities, in 
Territorial Aspect, at http://www.statistica.md/pageview.php?l=en&idc=295&id=2234.  
54   Neukirch, “Autonomy and Conflict Transformation …”, 110. 
55   Claus Neukirch, “National Minorities in the Republic of Moldova: Some Lessons Learned, Some Not?”, 
2(3) South East Europe Review (1999), 45–63, at 59. The author mentions certain tensions and elite 
behaviour as reasons for this. He repeated in an expert talk in Chisinau in July 2011 that the 
Bulgarians simply did not want to play a secondary role in the autonomy and so decided not to join. 
56   Christopher Hewitt, “Gagauzia”, in Christopher Hewitt and Tom Cheetham (eds.), Encyclopedia of 
Modern Separatist Movements (ABC-Clio, Oxford, 2000), 108–110, at 109. 
57   Chinn and Roper, “Territorial Autonomy …”, 98. Chinn notes that: “The title itself has significance. 
From the outset the law recognizes both the people and their land.”  
58   Parliament of the Republic of Moldova, Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri), 
unofficial translation, at http://www.alegeri.md/en/legislation/.  
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administrative authorities, leads also the Executive Council (Bakannik 
Kometeti), which is the permanent executive authority functioning as the 
government.
60 
The main content of the Autonomy Statute
61  give the impression that 
sufficient competences were granted to the autonomy. The special status for 
the Gagauz is said to be of “paramount importance”, and that it “set an 
example of both territorial autonomy and of minorities’ collective rights …”.
62 
It is also often pointed out that the compromise was made because Moldova 
was a weak state at this time and that the Transnistrian conflict made both 
sides speed up negotiations.
63  However, as scholars frequently stress, the 
main flaw of the Autonomy Statute was that its very basic formulation meant 
a lack of details. For instance, finances were dealt with in the Statute, but it 
refers to other documents and thereby avoids clear rights and responsibilities. 
While negotiations might have been easier on such a basis, the risk was that 
the autonomy would be undermined in the long run.
64 However, the fact that 
the agreement was reached largely without international mediation showed 
there had been sufficient trust and political will between the two sides to 
reach such a comprise.
65  
The rights of Gagauz Yeri were guaranteed by giving the law a high status, 
and were protected by legal mechanisms that made it complicated to amend. 
Still, changes were possible and clear constitutional support was missing at 
this point. While a number of issues were tackled and also some participation 
of minorities within the autonomy guaranteed, the incentives for further 
integration at this stage were limited. Counter to general recommendations, 
a clear system for dispute settlement was missing and the only way to deal 
with future conflicting issues was via the courts. At the same time, some sort 
of ‘constructive interdependence’ existed; by permitting symbols to the new 
entity and granting three languages –  Moldovan, Gagauzian and Russian – 
official status in Gagauzia, it paid respect to some of the main triggers for 
the conflict and important symbolic moments for the Gagauz.
66 
In the years after the Autonomy Statute was adopted, the Venice 
Commission of the CoE was frequently invited to assess proposed changes in 
Moldovan laws. With regard to the status of the Gagauz autonomy and further 
 
 
60   The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova Law on the Special Legal Status of Gagauzia (Gagauz 
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61   Ibid.  
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Moldova, undated, at http://www.ecmimoldova.org/Gagauzia.115.0.html, at 5. 
63   Priit, “Gagauzia and Moldova …”, 307. This view was supported by Ljubov Stepanovna Tshimpoesh. 
64   Oleh Protsyk and Valentina Rigamonti, “Real and ‘Virtual’ Elements of Power Sharing in the Post-
Soviet Space: The Case of Gagauzian Autonomy”, 6(1) Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues 
in Europe  (2007), 7–8; Stefan Wolff, “The Distribution of Competences between Centre and 
Autonomy”, September 2007, at http://www.stefanwolff.com/publications/the-distribution-of-
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65   Gottfried  Hanne (former Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova;  8 June 2011 –  Vienna).  
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66   Neukirch, “Autonomy and Conflict Transformation …”, 111–112. Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia 
 
www.eurac.edu/edap  14  edap@eurac.edu 
legal developments (the 1994 Constitution of Moldova,
67 1998 Legal Code of 
Gagauzia,
68  or the 1998 Law on Political Parties and Social-Political 
Organizations
69), the CoE experts were largely critical of actions taken and 
legislative adaptations initiated by both sides.
70  Legal developments after 
1994 furthermore showed that certain documents, like the Legal Code of 
Gagauzia,
71 came too late and again contained a number of contradictions. 
The authorities in Comrat tried to widen their competences and did not fully 
pay respect to the Constitution of Moldova (the Constitution) and the 1994 
Law. It took almost a decade until amendments were made to the 
Constitution to strengthen the autonomy’s status and the entity’s powers.
72 
This was a necessary and welcome step. But rather than jointly drafting the 
various corresponding acts, Chisinau and Comrat worked in parallel, and the 
opinion of international experts was heard but largely ignored. Moldovan 
authorities showed a lack of knowledge about the special legal status of 
Gagauzia. While some rights were cut off, others such as the right to propose 
legal initiatives were added, but it seemed that the People’s Assembly in 
Comrat lacked the capacity to use this option successfully. So the post-1994 
period was not characterized by physical confrontation, but by a number of 
court cases and attempts to unilaterally change the scope of the autonomy.  
2.3.3. Situation during 2001–2009  
The near decade of the Party of Communists’ rule in Moldova also had an 
influence on the relations with Comrat. On the positive side, amendments in 
the Constitution that strengthened the autonomy were introduced in 2004. 
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2.3.3.1. The Party of Communists’ Rise in Chisinau  
On 25 February 2001, the Party of Communists under Vladimir Voronin won 
parliamentary elections in the country. The party, while in opposition in 
Chisinau, was known as an advocate of Gagauz interests and also for its pro-
Russian statements, and had always received support from voters in the 
southern (and northern) region(s).
73  But unexpectedly, after coming into 
power, relations with Comrat considerably worsened.
74  The Party of 
Communists also started to stir internal political upheaval and ‘punished’ 
Gagauz leaders who did not comply with Chisinau’s views, leading to the 
complete subordination of autonomy representatives to Chisinau. Among 
various actions, they had tried to unseat the Head of the autonomy (Bashkan) 
Dumitru Croitor in order to replace him with a veteran communist.
75 Society’s 
feelings of alienation towards the capital increased and were mainly 
“manifested through increasing absenteeism of elections”.
76  
2.3.3.2. The Party of Communists’ Demise in Comrat 
In 2006 an important change in the political landscape of Gagauzia took 
place:  
Mihail Formuzal, mayor of the second biggest Gagauz city, Ciadur Lunga, won 
against the incumbent Bashkan Tabunscic, who had been openly supported by 
the Party of Communists.
77 The winner of the vote, after a second round, was 
running on an anti-communist platform.
78 Formuzal, against whom criminal 
charges had been initiated, softened his rhetoric towards the central 
authorities and was kept under pressure by court cases and the withholding of 
financial resources from the centre.
79  The autonomy was treated like any 
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78   Dumitru Lazur, “In Gagauzia, the Communists Experienced their First Defeat”, 8 December 2006, at 
http://www.api.md/articles/2646/en.html;  the Freedom House report of 2006 mentions the 
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to the elections: Freedom House, “County Report Moldova”, 2006, at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=47&nit=396&year=2006.  
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other district of the country
80  and, as a result of informal mechanisms of 
control, confrontations were limited and a certain “accommodationist 
approach”
81  on the part of Comrat could be seen. Worsening relations 
between Moldova and the Russian Federation in this period also had an effect 
on Gagauzia: the population of the entity was mainly living on agricultural 
products, and so the economic consequences of import constraints to the 
Russian Federation were strongly felt there.
82 
The main focus of President Voronin during this period was Transnistria, and 
Moldova’s approach towards the separatist entity had an influence on the 
dynamics between Comrat and Chisinau.
83  Positions and statements 
concerning a solution to Transnistria’s status varied due to political events, 
but when ties between Comrat and Chisinau deteriorated, as in 2000, the 
result was a renewal of the autonomy’s contacts with Transnistria.
84 Scholars 
called the link between the two regions an ‘alliance of convenience’, formed 
on the language issue and the fear of unification with Romania,
85 whereas a 
possible solution  to Transnistria will in any event also imply political 
developments for the south of Moldova. The authorities in Gagauzia have not 
stopped proposing to convert the Republic of Moldova into a federal state 
consisting of three entities –  Moldova, Gagauzia and Transnistria.
86  As the 
Minorities at Risk think tank concluded in 2006, if a resolution with 
Transnistria “includes greater autonomous powers for that region, which 
seems likely, some members of the Gagauz elite could call for greater 
political power in the Gagauz region as well, potentially aggravating political 
tension”.
87  
2.4. Developments after 2009 
During the April 2009 parliamentary elections, more than 60 per cent of the 
votes in Gagauzia were cast in favour of the Party of Communists. In the 
repeated election in July of the same year, 77 per cent voted for the 
communists.
88 Relations with the new government were strained by a number 
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of issues in 2010,
89 whereas this year was mainly marked by elections: two 
rounds of voting for Bashkan had to take place to finally confirm Mihail 
Formuzal as winner. This time during the polls, the central authorities did not 
try to directly influence the vote and observed the local political elite in their 
post-election dispute.
90 The Executive Committee was finally approved on 9 
March 2011, while the previous months had seen demonstrations by the 
opposition and internal political struggles.
91  Since then the autonomy has 
continued to be taken hostage by disputes between the Bashkan/Executive 
Committee and the People’s Assembly: the local budget could only be 
approved late in March 2012, following the attempt to dissolve the local 
parliament and the initiation of the Bashkan’s resignation procedure.
92  
The conflict between the legislative and executive authorities, and the 
three main political groupings in Gagauzia, with their (unofficial) affiliations 
in Chisinau, culminated in the organization of the local elections, due after 
the People’s Assembly’s term expired in April 2012. The previously planned 
election date of 29 July  2012, as well as the composition of the Election 
Commission, led to disputes.
93 The polls finally took place on 9 September 
2012, after the Election Commission had called them “on the brink of failure” 
due to underfunding.
94 A second voting date was necessary two weeks later. 
The results were: 25 mandates for independent candidates, 7 mandates for 
representatives of the Party of Communists, 2 mandates for candidates of the 
Liberal Democratic Party and one for the Party of Socialists.
95  
The local polls in Gagauzia proceeded relatively unnoticed by the rest of 
the country, such as the autonomy has not received sufficient attention in 
central politics since the change in power in Chisinau. Most experts attribute 
this to the fact that the priority in the centre is now to tackle issues such as 
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European integration and the economic crisis. Interlocutors in Comrat during 
the expert interviews in July 2011 referred to the continuing internal divisions 
in Chisinau as reasons for the little contact/interest from central authorities 
and stressed that the frequent holding of elections on a state level led to 
more passiveness of the electorate in the south.  
 
3. Drawing Lessons from Gagauzia – Assessing the Autonomy in 
2012 
3.1. Evaluation of the State of the Autonomy in 2012 
3.1.1. General Findings 
All experts gave a positive assessment of the 1994 Law and that a peaceful 
solution could be found to the conflict. Persons that had questioned the 
content of the Autonomy Statute already during the negotiations back then 
still maintained their position.
96  
Some experts believed that the 1994 Law as a solution to accommodate the 
Gagauz demands did not yield satisfactory results, citing the non-
development of the Gagauz language as an indicator. The autonomy to some 
extent might even be seen as a  
“self-isolation instrument.”
97  To understand the situation of Gagauzia one 
should see the wider perspective: Moldovan society had not agreed on its 
fundamental issues, the center did not show willingness for consolidation, and 
there was no agreement on certain historical facts; there was no substantial 
discussion of what united people in the country and a dialogue between cities 
was non-existent.
98 To some extent this view was voiced in the south as well: 
A number of interlocutors negatively mentioned that Romanian history was 
now taught in schools, and that it looked like only the Gagauz were fighting 
for maintaining the ‘Moldovan identity’ and independence.
99 As one of the 
leaders of the Gagauz movement, Stepan Topal, explained, it was the ongoing 
unsatisfactory situation that in 2011 led to the foundation of the Council of 
Elders. He said there was no danger of war, but it was now time to convince 
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people and finally solve the Gagauz question; the autonomy was stuck in a 
one-way street, so dialogue was needed.
100  Interlocutors with a political 
background in Comrat assessed that the autonomy was being ignored and was 
being treated as a district.  
In general, despite being in opposition to each other, all representatives of 
the United Gagauzia as well as the New Gagauzia movements shared nearly 
the same concerns and criticism. Bashkan Formuzal himself called the 
solution of the political elite in the 1990s “very wise”, and said that the law 
was very good, but up until 2012 it did not look as if anybody wanted to 
implement it. Instead of modernizing the legal framework, and giving 
Gagauzia more responsibilities, parts of the 1994 Law were adapted and the 
competences of the autonomy decreased. In recent years, the leadership of 
Moldova has managed to remove all ethnic Gagauz from leading positions in 
the country, meaning that Gagauzia was not able to fully participate in 
questions concerning Moldova.
101  He claimed that relations with Chisinau 
were not characterized by respect and there was a strong centralization.
102 As 
Bashkan Formuzal was responsible for the functioning of the autonomy, but 
had no tools to use. He also warned that at some point the “forgotten about 
nation” might ask: “If we are not necessary for you, maybe you are also not 
for us.”
103 The more the Autonomy Statute was ignored, the more self-rule 
the Gagauz would demand and radicalism in society could grow.
104 Political 
leaders in Comrat were prepared to cooperate with all parties that wanted to 
work for the autonomy, but did not see a real interest from their 
counterparts. For instance, a state development programme for the south of 
the country still did not exist.
105 “Sixteen and a half years of existence of the 
autonomy mean sixteen and a half years of missed opportunities by 
Moldova.”
106 
Similarly, other experts in Comrat noted the following concerns: Moldova 
would take out loans and receive international aid money, but these sums 
would not be distributed to Gagauzia. The conflicts in the centre were 
transferred to the autonomy as the same parties were also active in Gagauz 
Yeri. The autonomy was being ignored and expectations and promises from 
1994 not fulfilled.
107  
Experts in Chisinau and Vienna confirmed that central authorities were not 
paying much attention to the south; opinions concerning the reasons ranged 
from the political situation and economic possibilities preventing them from 
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doing so
108 to “consciously ignoring” that the Autonomy Statute existed.
109 
The approach towards the south was similar to the one towards other 
regions;
110 the people in power seemed to have “no wish, no money, or no 
vision”.
111 The Alliance for European Integration (AEI) coalition in Chisinau 
involved persons that had been against the autonomy in the 1990s; in 
addition, the AEI had different issues to deal with than Gagauzia.
112  With 
respect to the current financial and political crisis, it was recommended 
neither to start questioning the autonomy nor to try to fundamentally change 
things because that could lead to another crisis.
113 
Members of Parliament (MPs) of Gagauz origin were somewhat critical of 
the shortcomings in Comrat: MP Alexandru Stoianoglu said his party was 
prepared to implement more projects in Gagauzia, but better cooperation 
from the side of local politicians was necessary.
114 MP Irina Vlah confirmed 
that the autonomy was working, but looking back at its original idea – the 
protection of the Gagauz people, their culture, their economic development, 
the Gagauz language – there had not been much progress. Laws still were not 
consistent with each other, which led to problems.
115  
3.1.2. Internal Dynamics as Influencing Factors 
3.1.2.1. Divisions in Gagauzia and Behaviour of the Elite 
As Igor Botan analysed at the beginning of 2011, the conflicts between 
Chisinau and Comrat during the communist period left their mark until 
recently, and public scandals and court cases had characterized the 
relationship between the People’s Assembly and the Bashkan until 2012.
116 As 
was explained by experts in a number of talks, the main factions in Gagauzia, 
besides the Communists, were the  United Gagauzia movement of the 
Bashkan, and Comrat mayor Dudoglo’s New Gagauzia movement, which were 
constantly infighting after the Bashkan elections.
117 In general, there were a 
 
 
108  Igor Botan. 
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defence and public order, former deputy prosecutor of Moldova; 20 July 2011 – Chisinau).  
115  Irina Vlah (MP of the Communist Party; 20 July 2011 – Chisinau), however, stressed that the region 
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number of indicators of family politics and links between the elite – even if 
active in different political organizations.
118  
The struggle between the Bashkan and the speaker of the People’s 
Assembly was an obstacle to development.
119 MP Stoianoglu gave the example 
that his parliamentary commission had discussed a law proposal from the 
People’s Assembly and gave their supportive response, but under the 
precondition – as it was a complex project – that the local government would 
also endorse it, which had not happened.
120 MP Petru Vlah said that the fact 
that within Gagauzia the authorities would not cooperate with each other 
was, and will be, used by Chisinau.
121 Stepan Topal said that Chisinau would 
use the “divide and rule” principle and the current disunity in the elite was 
caused by party politics.
122 
When both central and regional authorities were from the same part of the 
political spectrum, that is, until 1998 and after 2001 until 2009, elites tried to 
reach solutions via direct deals with the parties in power in Chisinau.
123 It was 
also observed that the “autonomy was understood as a protection against 
interference from the outside”.
124  In general, experts perceived a very 
emotional approach in Comrat  to  matters  concerning the autonomy, for 
instance when attempts were made to initiate electoral reform in 
Gagauzia.
125 The organization of local elections falls within the autonomy’s 
competences, and when in 1997 Moldova introduced a new law, the Gagauz 
copied most of it, but since then they have not followed the changes in the 
state law.
126  
In a situation where one side wanted to undermine the Autonomy Statute, 
and the other side worked as if it was de  facto independent, a proper 
dialogue could not be conducted.
127  
3.1.2.2. Local Capacities 
Over the years the Gagauz faced problems in developing their own local 
human capital, and there were simply not enough competent persons to 
implement the legal and economic plans. Specialists who knew “how to use 
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the autonomy” were leaving the region
128 because of the economic situation, 
which was true for the whole country, leading to instabilities with cadre 
policies as well.
129 Approximately 25,000 of 160,000 inhabitants permanently 
migrated for work, with men leaving mainly for Russia and women for 
Turkey.
130  
One aspect that was pointed out by a few experts was the fact that the 
People’s Assembly in Comrat did not function on a professional basis, which 
also meant that deputies would not often meet and at times there were 
poorly attended sessions.
131 The 35 deputies worked on a volunteer basis and 
only members of the presidium were paid.
132 
3.1.2.3. Transnistria 
Bashkan Formuzal explained the current position of the autonomy as follows: 
if the Transnistria problem was solved the status of Gagauzia could not be 
lower than that of the other entity. If a federation was set up, the autonomy 
wanted to have a federative status as well. In late 2012, as in previous years, 
the de-facto government in Tiraspol (Transnistria) sees Gagauzia as an anti-
model.
133 While Transnistria was not a frequent topic during talks in Comrat, 
some participants voiced the hope that once this question was solved, it 
might have a positive effect on the south too.
134 
Other experts expressed the opinion that in Chisinau’s view, Transnistria 
needed a wider autonomy arrangement than Gagauzia, but that a federation 
was not a very popular idea; if some sort of asymmetric model was 
nevertheless found, the Gagauz would want as much as the Transnistrians – 
indicators of this have always been visible. So somehow the Gagauz had to be 
involved and, even more importantly, willingness had to be shown in order to 
solve the obstacles to the implementation of the 1994 Law, in parallel to the 
negotiation process with Transnistria.
135  “Based on what is happening in 
Gagauzia, they [Moldovans] have failed their exam here”
136.  The elites in 
Chisinau were aware that Gagauzia was not like Transnistria, but still   
a permanent dialogue was needed so as not to further antagonize the citizens 
in the south.
137 At the same time, Comrat’s display of solidarity and links with 
Tiraspol were not well perceived in Chisinau.
138 The ‘Gagauz factor’ thereby 
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played some role in the state-building question of the country when it came 
to the question of Transnistria.
139  
The 2012-elected leadership in Tiraspol has already shown interest in 
enlarging the current cooperation format with Gagauzia;
140 while the ‘5+2’ 
talks  –  the official international settlement negotiation process involving 
Transnistria, Moldova, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the OSCE, plus the 
US and the EU as external observers - were revived in September 2011,
141 the 
position of the parties largely remained unchanged and the topic of 
federalization was brought up in the media again.
142  
3.1.3. External Actors as Influencing Actors 
3.1.3.1. The Russian Federation 
Outside Gagauzia, the Russian Federation was accredited with having an 
interest in keeping the status quo and stopping the modernization in the 
country. Moldova should be kept unstable and not move forward, as worries 
about a potential new EU border coming closer were high. It was even hinted 
that Gagauzia was a product of Russian interests.
143 The MP of the Liberal 
Party explained that the territorial location and structure of Gagauzia could 
not be compared to compact Transnistria, which remained the main block 
used by Russia to halt any NATO enlargement further east.
144 
While most experts assumed that the links of Gagauzia with the Russian 
Federation were not as developed as those between Tiraspol and Moscow, 
they still referred to those connections as to more influential than those with 
Turkey. Besides, it was pointed out that there were historically developed, 
positive relations with the Russian Federation, and the population of the 
autonomy also mainly followed Russian mass media. This contributed to the 
Gagauz’ tendency to take pro-Russian positions.
145 
As a young non-governmental organization (NGO) activist in Comrat put it: 
“A good Gagauz is considered to be pro-Russian and Orthodox.”
146 One main 
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dilemma of Gagauz politics therefore appears to be that, in order to win the 
majority of votes in the ATU, politicians had to support topics linked to Russia 
(such as language and foreign policy) and to make sure the radical forces in 
the autonomy would not win these rhetorical fights.
147  Other experts 
confirmed this view and that calls before elections to make Russian a state 
language and other populist messages in this direction were clearly being 
made for internal purposes.
148 
During the visit to Comrat of a member of a Moscow think tank, who 
pointed out that Gagauzia represented an important factor in Russian–
Moldovan relations, the Bashkan also stressed the significant material support 
that had been provided to the autonomy by the Russian Federation.
149 When 
talking about the relations between Comrat and Moscow, the scope for 
conflict in external relations becomes obvious: while Gagauzia is often 
referred to as an important factor in Russian–Moldovan relations,
150 problems 
occurred when the sovereignty of Moldova seemed undermined.
151 
3.1.3.2. Turkey (and the Turkic World) 
Turkey’s role was, in general, assessed positively because all its economic and 
educational support was not focused on “stirring political hatred”.
152 Some 
voices claimed that Turkish diplomats were tired of going to Comrat and 
seeing that nothing had changed, and that some sort of “psychological 
inertia” could be observed.
153 The Turkish embassy gave a lot of support for 
infrastructure and other development projects, while at the same time took a 
critical position, especially concerning the Gagauz people’s slow progress 
learning their native language.
154 Scholarships and support of infrastructure 
projects based on agreements with Moldova would often only be given to 
Gagauzia.
155  One expert called the “pan-Turkism games”, which aimed to 
increase ties with Azerbaijan and Tatarstan, a normal phenomenon and part 
of protection seeking of the Gagauz from abroad.
156  
While Moldova’s newly elected President Nicolae Timofti rarely made 
statements about Gagauzia, during his visit to Turkey in June 2012 he called 
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for more loyalty towards the Republic of Moldova from the political and 
cultural elite of the autonomy.
157 
3.1.3.3. Romania 
Some commentators considered the ongoing ‘Romania-phobia’ in Gagauzia to 
be exaggerated because the Romanian political class’ agenda did not include 
unification.
158  The representative of the Liberal Party explained that 
unification would naturally take place once Moldova was integrated in the EU. 
Gagauzia would not be an obstacle on the path to integration, unlike 
Transnistria, and might even be in favour.
159  
After the change in power and the post-election situation had calmed down 
in Moldova, relations with Romania returned to normal. According to (former) 
Romanian Foreign Minister Teodor Baconschi, the EU would no longer suspect 
Bucharest of promoting a “hidden agenda” in relation to Moldova.
160  A 
diplomat from an EU institution in Chisinau explained, however, that Brussels 
was closely following Romania’s proactive policies as those sometimes did not 
tackle the country’s real problems.
161 
3.1.3.4. EU 
The EU was considered as a ‘magnetic field’ with the potential to consolidate 
the whole country.
162 MP Stoianoglu claimed that the opposition would often 
play on anti-Romanian sentiments and link EU integration with being under 
the control of the neighbouring country. But things were slowly changing and 
the younger generation was especially open to, and understanding of, 
European values. The declining support for the Communist party in Gagauzia 
was also an indicator of this.
163 Civil society representatives in Comrat stated 
that the population’s trust in the EU was very high.
164 
In Vienna, diplomats viewed the fact that Gagauzia showed an interest in 
transborder cooperation with Romania as an indicator for a change of the 
Cold War mentality.
165 Bashkan Formuzal considered the EU perspective, in 
general, to be the “most attractive and a possible solution to all conflicts”.
166 
The ATU at that point had no special cooperation programme with the EU, 
but could rely on good contacts with the diplomatic corps of some EU 
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countries.
167  Moldovan external policy was changing every year, and the 
Bashkan voiced disappointment that Gagauzia’s attempt to join the Lower 
Danube region had, so far, been blocked by Moldova. Appropriate documents 
were prepared and visits paid to Galati in Romania in an attempt to become 
part of this ‘Euroregion’, but Chisinau halted Gagauzia’s participation in 
related projects –  and thereby ended the possibility of receiving 
investments.
168  
Despite Moldova’s enthusiasm for links with the EU,
169  in 2012 the 
integration process was reaching a point where complicated internal reforms 
had to take place. Improvements in the rule of law and good governance 
would have a positive impact on the autonomy to function better, and there 
would be more stability, which was as important for the socio-economic 
development of Gagauzia. In the end, new EU perspectives were good for 
Gagauzia.
170 On 15 May 2012, Europe Day was celebrated for the first time in 
Comrat.
171  
3.1.4. Integration with Moldova 
The autonomy had economic ties with other regions and a number of 
branches of enterprises from Chisinau, for instance, in Comrat.
172 In general, 
however, all experts came to the conclusion that after the 1994 Law came 
into force, there was no sign of an increased integration of Gagauz society 
and this objective so far has not been achieved. Since the autonomy 
depended on financial support from the centre, the support could be used as 
leverage would the autonomy not share national interests, for example, in 
relation to the state language.
173  
3.1.4.1. Language  
The Gagauz consider themselves part of the larger Russian-language 
community, which is 25 per cent of the country’s population, and repeatedly 
invoke the linguistic question. Once again during the summer of 2011, the 
Bashkan called for official documents sent to Comrat to be in Russian, and 
not Romanian, otherwise they would be refused.174 Later that year Comrat 
confirmed that it was then receiving official documents in two languages, and 
the ones in Romanian only were returned.175  
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In April 2012 the Bashkan stated that letters from Chisinau, not translated 
into Russian, would be answered in the Gagauz language. In addition, he said 
that there were insufficient qualified translators to cope with the demand.
176 
Earlier attempts to obtain more financial support for Moldovan language 
training were turned down by Chisinau, stating that language training was the 
autonomy’s responsibility.
177 Only 57 Moldovan teachers in Gagauzia had any 
experience,
178 and due to the lack of finances the autonomy could not even 
open one Gagauz school.
179  
Experts also repeated the fact that this language-training problem had to 
be solved, with some saying that the issue was mainly linked to financial 
resources. There were clear signs that people in the ATU, especially in the 
administration, wanted to learn the state language, and they were even 
prepared to pay to do so. The authorities in Chisinau, who claimed a lack of 
funds because of the economic crisis, were weak on this point, but it was this 
question to bring the two sides closer again.
180 Prof. Tshimpoesh called on the 
government to take responsibility for the training issue and to do something 
about it. Modern methods are needed in language training. Also, she 
considered the protection of the Gagauz culture to be the responsibility of 
the autonomy’s authorities, who were, in fact, not fulfilling this role.
181 An 
example  is the Gagauz National Theatre (named after M. Cakir), which 
performs successfully abroad but receives little support in Gagauzia.
182 Some 
experts were more critical of the Gagauz, asking why they did not show more 
interest in improving the knowledge of their native language.
183  
Many visitors to Gagauzia are struck by the fact that Russian is the main 
language and that sometimes the Gagauz are not fluent in their native 
tongue. There is no school that teaches solely in Gagauz, and efforts to set up 
a trial are made up and then, while parents are said to believe that Russian 
and Moldovan are sufficient to know for their children. At the time of writing 
in 2012, one prototype school and kindergarten   
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(with two groups) are functioning in Comrat.
184 Also, there is limited teaching 
in Gagauz at the University of Comrat, where teaching in Russian 
dominates.
185  
MP Stoianoglu mentioned that a programme to address the language 
problem so far could not be implemented because of the political instability. 
Nobody was forced to learn Moldovan, but in order to have a career and work 
for the state, knowing Moldovan was a necessity, as it was for those in the 
field of higher education. Unfortunately, a clear state policy does not yet 
exist.
186  
In a recent 2012 report on linguistic rights of the Gagauz in Moldova 
(“Implementation of Linguistic Rights of the Gagauz of Moldova: Integration 
of the Gagauz Community into the Society of Moldova” by the Pilgrim-Demo 
Youth Centre), the authors stated that Gagauzia was a Russian-language 
autonomy and that there were serious contradictions between the Law of the 
Republic of Moldova on Languages and the Law of Gagauz Yeri on Languages. 
Furthermore, the Gagauz language was not a language of the passport system 
in Moldova, thus violating the right to privacy of the Gagauz.
187 In conclusion, 
the authors stated that the original purpose of the creation of Gagauzia, 
namely to preserve and develop the Gagauz language and culture, as well as 
to implement the linguistic and cultural rights of the Gagauz in Moldova, had 
not been achieved.
188 
3.1.4.2. Education 
Education is closely linked to the question of language and is an important 
factor of integration into the country. During the author’s field-research visit 
to Moldova in 2011, a representative case of the connected problems of 
language and education, and the integration of the Gagauz, was frequently 
mentioned and in the daily headlines. In July a number students from 
Gagauzia failed their final exams in the Romanian language and literature. 
There were furious reactions in Comrat, with authorities blaming the 
government for failing to deliver on a promise to increase funding and 
improve the study of the state language in Gagauzia.
189  The Gagauz 
 
 
184  Irina Vlah. This would be the wish of the parents, since the study of up to four languages was a 
great hardship for children. 
185  Hatlas and Zyromski, Power, Administration and Ethnic Minorities  …, 88. See the university’s 
website: Komrat Devlet Universiteti, at http://www.kdu.md/ – most of its content is in Russian. 
Stepan Topal had pointed out that the rector of the university for the past years had been 
appointed by Chisinau, and the local authorities were not included in this selection process. For the 
first year, the university had run solely on local donations. 
186  Alexandru Stoianoglu. He listed language as the main factor for the further integration of the 
autonomy and for people to feel themselves as fully fledged citizens. 
187  Pilgrim-Demo Youth Centre, Policy Brief “Implementation of Linguistic Rights of the Gagauz of 
Moldova: Integration of the Gagauz Community into the Society of Moldova”, (Pilgrim-Demo Youth 
Centre, Comrat, 2012). They stress that, however, no claims were made by the Gagauz concerning 
this issue, and. 
188  Ibid. 
189  This situation concerned more than 100 pupils, and the fact that not many peers lived nearby that 
spoke the state language as well as that qualified teachers were missing were mentioned as 
problems in talks with Irina Vlah and Petru Vlah. The latter had the impression that once somebody Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia 
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authorities demanded the tests be repeated and warned they would award 
certificates themselves.
190  Interim President Marian Lupu held both the 
central government and the authorities in Gagauzia responsible for this 
situation, and asked for a “calm and negotiated solution between Gagauz 
authorities and the Education Ministry”.
191 Finally in August, after a meeting 
between the Bashkan and the Prime Minister,  a solution was found which 
allowed the students to commence their studies and repeat the language 
exams in 2012.
192 According to Claus Neukirch, the truth was somewhere in 
between (to not want to learn the state language versus to not want to 
support its advancement). The problem started with the education system in 
Moldova, where language training across ethnic lines was not very efficient. 
The Romanian-speakers no longer learned Russian. To do so depended on the 
decision and involvement of the parents (which kindergarten to go to, 
language learning support in addition) – especially in homogeneous regions 
like Gagauzia where there was limited opportunity to speak the state 
language. At the same time, on a day-to-day basis one could survive in the 
country knowing only Russian; the position was the same in Chisinau. There 
were no incentives to learn the other language, and teaching was not strong. 
Unlike in the Baltic states, in Moldova things moved slowly with little pressure 
on minorities concerning this issue and with limited international support.
193 
3.1.4.3. Representation in State Structures 
Another important point –  stated by one expert and reiterated by most 
interview partners in Comrat –  was that Gagauzia wanted more of its 
representatives to work in state institutions; if the will existed, it was 
certainly possible to find competent persons to take high-level positions in 
ministries. It seemed that the Gagauz have always been poorly represented in 
government structures, but no actions have been taken to remedy the 
situation.
194 Section 3.1.5.1. deals with this aspect as well. 
 
 
in Gagauzia had a problem, the local authorities exploited this for personal public relations 
activities. 
190  Gagauzlar, “Румынский как иностранный” [Romanian as a Foreign (Language)], 22 July 2011, at 
http://www.gagauzlar.md/libview.php?l=ru&idc=312&id=2572&parent=0. 
191  Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Moldovan Leader Spreads Blame for Language Tensions in 
Gagauzia”, 4 August 2011, at 
http://www.rferl.org/content/moldovan_leader_spreads_blame_for_tensions_in_gagauzia/2428709
8.html.  
192  Kommersant.md,  “Гагаузы  помогли  всем”  [The  Gagauz  Helped  All],  9  August  2011,  at 
http://www.kommersant.md/node/4229. 
193  Claus Neukirch. It was also pointed out by Irina Vlah that no statewide programme was in place to 
support minorities in the study of the state language. 
194  Liubomir Chiriac. He could only recall Mr Stoianoglu who had been deputy Prosecutor. Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia 
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3.1.5. Selected Functions 
3.1.5.1. Political Representation at the State Level 
Representation of Gagauzia in the centre is currently ensured through three 
main provisions: 
(1) the electoral process; 
(2) the arrangements under the 1994 Law provide that all members of the 
Gagauz executive committee are members of government ministries in 
the centre, including an ex officio position for the Bashkan; 
(3) Gagauzia has the right to legislative initiative in the Republic of 
Moldova’s national parliament. Wolff calls this feature unique as it has 
the potential to provide “an effective mechanism to introduce 
legislation in the  national parliament in areas that remain in the 
competence of the central government but that have a particular 
impact on Gagauzia”.
195  
(1) A change in laws had a decisive influence on Gagauzia. From 1991, the 
Law on Political Parties and Social-Political  Organizations went through 
various amendments before becoming an organic law in 2007. Since 1998, 
following another provision, it has become relatively complicated to found a 
party as a number of prerequisites have to be fulfilled, which is especially an 
obstacle to small ethnic groups.
196 The law requires that a party can only be 
registered if it has at least 5,000 members who reside in at least half of the 
intermediate-level administrative-territorial units, with at least 150 members 
in each of them. In fact, the law only led to the non-functioning of ethnic 
Gagauz parties in Gagauz Yeri.
197 Since then the local elites have demanded 
the opportunity to create political parties in the autonomy.
198 
In their March 2010 study on party competition and legislative recruitment 
in Moldova, the results found by Oleh Protsyk and Ion Osonian depict the 
following situation for the Gagauz: in general, Moldova is characterized by 
multi-ethnic political organizations and, as statistics show, parties on the left 
spectrum especially are known for their diverse ethnic membership. Because 
of the Transnistria problem, proportional representation was chosen as the 
electoral formula.
199  By combining data on the ethnic distribution of the 
population with data on the ethnic composition of the Moldovan parliament, 
Protsyk and Osonian come to the conclusion that Gagauz are ‘perfectly’ 
represented from a statistical view, and at times had even been 
 
 
195  Stefan Wolff, “Representation of Autonomous Entities at the Level of the Central Government: 
Options and Recommendations for Gagauzia”, December 2007, at 
http://www.stefanwolff.com/publications/representation-of-autonomous-entities-at-the-level-of-
the-central-government. He advised in his study for the EU, with respect to the general framework 
found in Moldova, to keep these mechanisms and use them properly. 
196  Munteanu, Political Parties Legislation in Moldova ..., 66. 
197  Osonian and Protsyk, Ethnic or Multi-Ethnic Parties? …, 7. 
198  Bowers, The Moldovan Confederation …, 71–73. 
199  Osonian and Protsyk, Ethnic or Multi-Ethnic Parties? …, 6. Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia 
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overrepresented.
200  MPs originating from Gagauzia –  but not representing 
Gagauzia, however – agreed that they had sufficient opportunities to work for 
the autonomy in their parties, and that it depended on one’s will and 
initiative to do so. All parties were represented in Gagauzia, and so there 
were no obstacles to lobbying for Gagauz’ interests through them.
201 MP Petru 
Vlah noted that the political leaders of the ATU were also members of state 
wide political parties.
202 
A different view was held by interlocutors in Gagauzia: the autonomy’s 
interests were not represented properly in parties as they were not parties 
from there. One person mentioned that political parties “remembered” the 
Gagauz just before election times and it appeared to be a “matter of honour” 
to have a Gagauz in a leading position in a party.
203 One expert stressed that 
the non-existence of a (regional) political party system in the autonomy also 
had an impact on the political representation and related processes within 
the ATU. A real structured political process was almost impossible in 
Gagauzia. Many independent candidates were always elected during polls, but 
without clear political affiliations and with changing positions it remained 
hard for the electorate to see politics in the form of parties and programmes. 
Therefore, to the electorate it would always be about personalities and 
village connections.
204  
As developments in 2011 and 2012 show, the topic of regional parties is still 
of significance in Gagauzia. At the beginning of 2011 the New Gagauzia 
movement gave details of plans to transform itself into the United Bujac 
party, a left-centrist, pro-Russia organization, which would also include 
representatives of the Taraclia district as well as ethnic Gagauz and Bulgarian 
associations from other parts of the country.
205 In August a similar initiative 
was started by the Bashkan, whereby his  party, which would unite with 
representatives of Taraclia would be called the ‘Party of Regions’.
206 As the 
media asserted, increased verbal attacks on Mihail Formuzal originated in this 
new initiative.
207 The local polls in Gagauzia in September 2012 again showed 
 
 
200  Ibid., 17–19. Irina Vlah also mentioned the fact that about 4 per cent of MPs (4 persons, in 3 
parties) were of Gagauz origin, which meant a proper representation in parliament. Before 2010, 
Gagauz had only been represented through the Communist party. 
201  Irina Vlah; Alexandru Stoianoglu. 
202  Petru Vlah. 
203  Anonymous background talk; June 2011 –  Vienna. Igor Botan stressed that the Gagauz were 
remembered by political parties mainly before elections came up. 
204  Gottfried Hanne. 
205  Infotag, “New Gagauzia Movement to be Transformed into Political Party”, 14 February 2011,   
at http://totul.md/en/arhiv/newsitem/22525.html. “The 20-year practice of struggle for national 
self-determination has shown that not a single all-republican political party in Moldova is able or 
cares to solve the problems existing in the territories inhabited by the Gagauz and Bulgarians, or to 
protect their interests on the republican level. Therefore, the new party will be working to unite 
healthy political forces, primarily of the Gagauzes and Bulgarians, to protect their interests at all 
levels.” 
206  Publika,  “Михаил  Формузал  планирует  создать  собственную  политическую  партию”  
[Mihail Formuzal Plans to Set up own Political Party], 28 August 2011,   
at http://ru.publika.md/link_265471.html. 
207  Gagauzlar,  “Скандал  за  скандалом:  новый  выпад  Харламенко  против  Формузала”  
[Scandal after Scandal: New Insult by Harlamenko against Formuzal], 14 October 2011,   
at http://www.gagauzlar.md/libview.php?l=ru&idc=295&id=2949&parent=0. Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia 
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the electorate’s preference for ‘independent candidates’, whereas the future 
deputies all have a more or less direct affiliation to one of the political 
movements in the autonomy. The election of two members of the Liberal 
Democratic Party this time was a new development. Neither Formuzal’s nor 
Dugoglu’s new regional parties had fielded candidates in the local elections, 
however. 
(2) Representatives of the executive power of Gagauzia also participate in 
corresponding committees on a state level to guarantee coordination in issues 
such as security or the economy. This cooperation, as stipulated by law, 
worked well, according to one MP.
208 The Bashkan noted that as an ex officio 
member of the government, he could in principle raise any issue and come up 
with proposals, but it was impossible to obtain the consent of other members. 
Once when he voted against the budget, it was nevertheless adopted.
209 He 
could not influence any processes, even those concerning Gagauzia.
210  
(3) An analysis from 2008 pointed out that the People’s Assembly never 
used its right for a legal initiative to propose a change with respect to the 
party law (1), which might give an indication about how important this issue 
really is.
211 This option seemed not to be actively used in 2011 either.
212 Then 
People’s Assembly speaker Ana Harlamenko claimed that the parliament 
would not look at the legal initiatives, and they would not be considered in 
the committees. No contact existed with the assembly in Comrat, no 
information exchange took place and the local deputies were not included in 
any delegation. According to her, parliament, as the bigger institution, should 
contact the People’s Assembly, and joint commissions were possible. “When 
we propose them something – there is simply no answer.”
213  
MP  Alexandru Stoianoglu recalled that, in previous years, Comrat 
repeatedly demanded representation in Chisinau. From a formal point of 
view, this was not possible and in general the Gagauz should work on being 
competitive enough to achieve positions in central structures, and refrain 
from calls for ethnic quotas. The same should be the position for the 
parliament.
214  Concerning the right for legal initiatives, contradicting Ana 
Harlamenko, he explained that the People’s Assembly would propose 
unrealistic projects (for example, concerning tax exclusions in Comrat), and 
 
 
208  Alexandru Stoianoglu. Among all the experts, only he referred to this aspect of cooperation. 
209  Irina Vlah. She claimed in her interview that the Bashkan had some power as he could block the 
budget, which he done during the Communists’ tenure, but not in the past two years.  
210  Mihail Macar Formuzal. In his own words: “I participate there like a piece of furniture.” Although 
the 1994 Law speaks about participation in the implementation of the Moldovan internal and 
external policies affecting the interests of Gagauzia, there was no concrete mechanism in place, 
Gagauzia can always be ignored and the Bashkan during government sessions outvoted, Gottfried 
Hanne explained his criticism. 
211  Igor Botan, “Are Regional Parties really Necessary?”, 6 March 2008, 
http://www.alegeri.md/en/gagauzia2008/comments/20080306/. He assessed that the isolation of 
the autonomy could probably be better changed through the language factor; regional parties might 
even deepen it. 
212  Claus Neukirch. 
213  Ana Harlamenko. 
214  Alexandru Stoianoglu. Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia 
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nothing that could be implemented was submitted.
215 MP Irina Vlah also saw 
that the right to legal initiatives was simply used for small proposals of local 
relevance. The People’s Assembly had to be active and work for Gagauz issues 
because Chisinau would not care if it was inactive.
216 
3.1.5.2. Legislative and Executive Rights  
When Chisinau initiated the cancellation by the Constitutional Court of 
those provisions from the 1994 Law that would allow the People’s Assembly to 
propose judges, the problems in relation to legislative and executive rights 
started.
217 This issue remained of concern to political activists in Comrat, as 
it was negatively highlighted that the Tribunal of Gagauzia – a court of second 
instance that was to function in the autonomy according to the Code of 
Gagauzia  –  had not been set up and therefore only Moldovan courts 
functioned in Gagauzia.
218 
In early July 2011, a representative of the State Chancellery
219 had taken 
office in Comrat without properly informing the local authorities. Similar to 
the 2008 attempts to install a prefekt in Gagauzia, which led to conflict with 
the centre, it seemed that Chisinau had established another control 
mechanism. This has already led to some discussions and was perceived with 
suspicion.
220  Later in 2011, General Prosecutor Valeri Zubko asked the 
Constitutional Court to scrap the autonomy’s right to nominate the local 
prosecutor, which is laid down in the Autonomy Statute; this was met with 
great protest in Comrat.
221  The initiative was based on the fact that, 
according to the Constitution of Moldova, the appointment of the judiciary 
was an exclusive competence of the national authorities. There have been no 
further developments, but it is likely that the issue will be addressed again.
222 
3.1.5.3. Embodiment of the Status Law 
The change to the Constitution in 2003, though disputed by some, was a 
guarantee of the judicial strengthening of the autonomy. In addition, the 
change also meant that certain contradictions in the 1994 Law were 
 
 
215  Petru Vlah. Like his colleague from the Communist party, he stressed initiatives from Comrat would 
be looked at and discussed within the commissions. 
216  Irina Vlah. 
217  Gottfried Hanne.  
218  Nikolai Telpiz; Fiodor Gagauz; Ana Harlamenko. The latter said that the judges – who had to know 
Moldovan – would sometimes rule following Moldovan, sometimes Gagauzian law. 
219  The State Chancellery, at http://www.ncu.moldova.md/en/index. 
220  Fiodor Gagauz; Ana Harlamenko. Asked if this institution can become a mechanism of dialogue or 
for solving questions between the entities, Fiodor Gagauz answered negatively as the representative 
seemed to have a control function, which was not welcomed in the autonomy. Vlah Petru, however, 
explained that the new representative had a neutral function under the Prime Minister, enabling 
the cooperation of the Prosecutor together with the executive committee. This structure could ask 
the local and other councils to present their resolutions if necessary. 
221  Kommersant.md,  “Гагаузия  протестует  против  сокращения  полномочий  автономии”  [Gagauzia 
Protests against the Limitations of the Authority of the Autonomy, 9 November 2011, at 
http://www.kommersant.md/node/5461. 
222  Email communication with Mihail Sirkeli, Pilgrim-Demo NGO, 3 June 2012. Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia 
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confirmed.
223 According to the hierarchy of laws, the autonomy would have to 
bring its laws into line with the state ones, whereas the Gagauz refer to the 
political compromise that was reached in the 1990s, which intended that 
Moldova would bring its laws into conformity.
224  
Despite continuing contradictory interpretations, all interviewed experts 
agreed that the current law systems were not corresponding to each other. 
Signed cooperation agreements between parliament and the People’s 
Assembly have never been implemented.
225 In general, MPs of Gagauz origin 
working in the parliament stressed their potential role as dialogue partners 
for colleagues from Comrat – an offer that has not been accepted to date.
226 
Other experts saw the problems in Chisinau. MPs in the Moldovan 
parliament did not know much about the autonomy and its laws, so the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) had proposed – 
without success – the establishment of a People’s Assembly liaison office to 
facilitate drafting laws and assist with checking the drafts.
227 Ana Harlamenko 
reiterated the long-standing Gagauz demand that quotas should enable 
participation in parliament, and Gagauz also be represented in other levels of 
the state. As the speaker of the People’s Assembly, she had no rights and 
could not participate in parliamentary commissions.
228 
MP Stoianoglu pointed out that the People’s Assembly had competences in 
certain fields that were clearly laid down in the Autonomy Statute. Up until 
2012, the deputies in the autonomy would – due to incompetence – simply 
copy state laws and then add their own ideas, which in the end led to 
juridical chaos and contradictions in the implementation of the laws. 
Furthermore, this process was not monitored and by 2012 a number of laws 
existed which went beyond the autonomy’s competences.
229  
3.1.5.4. Revision Mechanisms of the Autonomy 
In general, after the constitutional changes and with respect to the 1994 
Law’s status as organic law, a revision of the Autonomy Statute demanded a 
broad consensus in Chisinau and Comrat. Most experts referred to the 
continuing contradictions in the document, but calls for adaptations were not 
strong. One opinion was that changing the Autonomy Statute should not be 
talked about – only strengthening it should be discussed.
230 MP Victor Popa 
 
 
223  Victor Mocanu. 
224  Igor Botan. This was also mentioned by Nikolai Telpiz as proof that the early promises had not been 
fulfilled by the central authorities and that the autonomy was being undermined. 
225  Irina Vlah claimed that the authorities in Comrat appeared to have no interest in this. 
226  Alexandru Stoianoglu; Petru Vlah. 
227  Gottfried Hanne.  
228  Ana Harlamenko. Victor Mocanu also remembered the case put forward by the People’s Assembly 
some years ago where they had asked for change of the status of its deputies to the same as MPs in 
the parliament of Moldova, whereas this request was declined. 
229  Alexandru Stoianoglu. According to Vlad Petru, for the past three years, not one law was adopted to 
improve the living standards of Gagauzia. Among the law initiatives sent to Chisinau, either the 
topics were unrealistic or focused on exclusions for inhabitants of Gagauzia, which were not 
possible. 
230  Irina Vlah.  Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia 
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stressed that the statute was full of contradictions, but if somebody wanted 
to change it, this would be seen immediately as a violation of minority 
rights.
231 Pragmatic voices explained that very clear issues could easily be 
solved without changing the law.
232  Bashkan Formuzal actually reached 
agreement with the parliament to form a working group and discuss certain 
issues of the 1994 Law, especially concerning legislation and finances, but the 
working group never met.
233 No other functioning commissions or mechanisms 
existed, other than through the Constitutional Court.
234 
A current issue and topic of discussion is the territorial structure of 
Gagauzia and attempts to change its geographic arrangement.
235 Recently, it 
was observed that there was a tendency for people outside the autonomy to 
officially register in Comrat or close by in order to, for instance, get medical 
help. The parliament was against villages joining the autonomy, as this was 
perceived as separatism. In previous years, three villages wanted to join the 
ATU, and they had already been part of a joint district in Soviet times.
236 
Officially, it was possible via referenda to change the structure, something 
that had been done in other parts of the country, but in Gagauzia it was not 
allowed.
237  
3.1.5.5. Autonomous Administration and Economic Aspects 
The disputed issue of the distribution of the budget was still an important 
topic in 2011. In general, the budget formation in Moldova was unclear and 
the authorities could not agree on how to manage it properly.
238 As in other 
issues, the explanations in Chisinau differed from the positions in Comrat and 
a certain mix of contradiction, confusion and populism was apparent: for 
example, in Gagauzia the budget funds should comprise taxes collected in the 
autonomy, transfer payments and additional funds for bigger investments 
such as infrastructure. Also, the three Gagauz MPs gave varying budget 
figures, and said that they observed populism on the side of Comrat, 
especially since budget cuts would not only concern the autonomy but the 
whole country.
239  
In the first half of 2011, the press reported the ongoing dispute. The 
United Gagauzia movement said the central Moldovan authorities had “an 
unfair approach to  Gagauzia’s budget formation”, and demanded the 
 
 
231  Victor Popa.  
232  Liubomir Chiriac. 
233  Gottfried Hanne. 
234  Irina Vlah. Like other experts, she agreed that a permanent dialogue between the centre and the 
autonomy was necessary.  
235  In his paper, Avram pointed out that this provision could potentially create territorial instability. 
Avram, Territorial Autonomy of the Gagauz …, 14–15. 
236  Liubomir Chiriac explained that this case illustrated not only a problem in the south, but in general 
in the whole country, thanks to the administrative structure that had been introduced by the 
Communists, creating too many communities that were not in a financial situation to solve local 
problems. He asserted that maybe it would have been necessary to create such a precedent case.  
237  Mihail Macar Formuzal.  
238  Gottfried Hanne.  
239  Irina Vlah; Alexandru Stoianoglu; Petru Vlah. Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia 
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approval of the initial autonomy budget draft.
240  The Bashkan said that, 
although he was a member of the government of Moldova, he did not know 
the criteria for the budget distribution, that is, if it was based on the size of 
the territory or the population. As Gagauzia had no lobby in the centre it had 
little opportunity to influence this process. The autonomy would be informed 
what it would receive, irrespective of whether it corresponded to its real 
needs or not.
241 Other politicians in the ATU decried the fact that the income 
from customs was taken away in 2006 and that, in general, rather than 
depending on Chisinau, Comrat should receive more autonomy in relation to 
finances.
242 
One issue that caused previous disputes was privatization,
243 but it seems 
that since 2011 it is no longer on the table – in theory, the process should be 
finished.
244 In 2006/2007, a new rule was introduced that made privatization 
the responsibility of local authorities, and the People’s Assembly simply had 
to confirm the list. Also, questions concerning the regional economic policy 
were dealt with in Comrat.
245 
A 2008 report about the business environment in the autonomy came to the 
following conclusions: the legislative environment and frequent unexpected 
changes in laws were weaknesses; also, frequent controls, especially by the 
police, remained a problem. Many companies considered corruption a 
fundamental barrier to the development of their business in Gagauzia.
246 In 
general, the significance of the economic situation in the ATU was pointed 
out by all experts; because of it, about 28 per cent of all male and female 
adults are abroad.
247 On the one hand, separatist-minded groups in Comrat 
understand that the autonomy was too weak to survive on its own; with only 
3–4 per cent of all investments in Moldova being made in Gagauzia, the 
outlook was not good. For this reason, development papers were elaborated 
and a donors’ forum was also organized in 2009.
248  After that no big 
investments were made in Gagauzia and no new  jobs created, so the 
autonomy seems to be in economic isolation.
249  A locally adopted law on 
 
 
240  AZI,  “United Gagauzia Movement  Accuses Moldova Government of Insufficient Financing”,   
29 March 2011, at http://www.azi.md/en/story/17404.  
241  Mihail Macar Formuzal. 
242  Ana Harlamenko. However, most experts came to the conclusion that Gagauzia could not be self-
sufficient and would always depend on transfer payments from the central budget.  
243  Gottfried Hanne recalled that at some point, the central government had put property on the 
privatization list without asking Gagauzia.  
244  Victor Mocanu. 
245  Irina Vlah. Since then, no problems in this aspect have appeared.  
246  Expert Grup, “Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia: Analysis of the Economic Situation and 
Development Potential”, January–May 2008, at http://www.expert-
grup.org/index.php?new_language=0&go=biblioteca&n=70, 138.  
247  Vitali Burlaca. He said that 15 per cent of children were left alone without parents in Gagauzia. 
248  Liubomir Chiriac. See also, Igor Munteanu and Liubomir Chiriac, The Strategy of Social and 
Economic Development of Gagauzia (Gagauz Yeri) 2009–2015 (Viitorul, Chisinau, 2009). Liubomir 
Chiriac explained that the aim was for regional cooperation via the Euroregion Lower Danube, and 
there was still a lot of potential for fruitful investment in this area. 
249  Irina Vlah. This was despite the fact that the autonomy possessed a number of investment-friendly 
aspects, like tax reduction and other incentives that could be adopted for individual cases by the 
People’s Assembly. A free economic zone was established in the very south of the autonomy: See 
the corresponding website at http://www.freezone-valcanes.md/portal/index.php. Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia 
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foreign investment was called a destabilizing and obstacle-creating 
document.
250  In the summer of 2012, Bashkan Formuzal called on the 
president of the Republic to take note of the politically motivated actions 
against enterprises in the autonomy.
251 
3.1.5.6. International Relations 
Many experts were keen to point out that such types of stipulated relations 
could only be directed towards economic and cultural or other cooperation, 
but not diplomatic relations.
252 At the moment of writing in 2012, Gagauzia 
has “representatives of the ATU Gagauz Yeri” in ten countries.
253  
3.1.5.7. Civil Society, Media and Human Rights 
When talking about minorities in Gagauzia,
254  Bulgarians are mentioned 
most frequently. Unlike the Gagauz, Bulgarians remained “passive and less 
passionate” after 1989, and were mainly found in the neighbouring Taraclia 
district.
255 Relations between ethnic groups could be considered as calm and 
harmonious.
256 However, few Bulgarians lived within Gagauzia, in fact only in 
the village of Kirsovo they settled next to Gagauz.
257 By the end of the 1990s, 
the People’s Assembly accepted Bulgarian as an official language, but this 
idea did not function in practice.
258  MP Petru Vlah  could not recall any 
problems in the sphere of inter-ethnic relations in Gagauzia.
259 
In general, interlocutors did not see any problems in the field of freedom 
of media in the autonomy. The only regular Gagauz language newspaper was 
Ana Sözü, published once a month in Chisinau. One person at times published 
Aru Töz and Gagauz Yeri in the local language. Seven other Russian 
publications, regional or in cities only, were issued on a weekly basis. Two 
radio stations and eight television stations, private as well as public, were 
broadcasting, though mainly in Russian.
260 
 
 
250  Alexandru Stoianoglu. 
251  Infotag, “Gagauzia Governor Urging Moldovan President to Consider Raider Phenomenon Developing 
in Autonomous Region”, 1 August 2012, at http://www.infotag.md/news-en/596275/.  
252  For instance, see the expert talk with Victor Popa.  
253  Official Website of Gagauzia, List of Representatives from 2010, at 
http://www.gagauzia.md/pageview.php?l=ru&idc=470&nod=1&. 
254  The Law of the Republic of Moldova on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National Minorities and 
the Legal Status of their Organizations, at http://www.usefoundation.org/view/437, “guarantees 
equality before the law and equal protection before the law to persons belonging to national 
minorities. Any kind of discrimination based on the national minority affiliation is prohibited”. 
255  Oazu Nantoi. He mentioned that four political movements  with a Bulgarian background were 
registered in Moldova. 
256  Ivan Grec. Ivan gave as reasons the joint history and faith over the past decades. 
257  Dimitri Ivanovitsh Popozoglo (journalist, editor of Edinaja Gagauzia; 23 July 2011 – Comrat. During a 
visit to the settlement, it was explained that the main street actually used to divide the Gagauz 
and Bulgarian neighbourhoods, something that has changed in recent years. See also Hatlas and 
Zyromski, Power, Administration and Ethnic Minorities …  
258  Hatlas and Zyromski, Power, Administration and Ethnic Minorities …, 55. 
259  Petru Vlah. 
260  Dimitri Ivanovitsh Popozoglo. There was no printing press, however, and everything had to be 
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It was easy to found a non-governmental organization (NGO), and about 
350 were registered in Gagauzia. Most of them worked on a project basis, 
focused on sports and religion, but only eight could be considered to be really 
active. In July 2011, only a Turkish foundation had a branch in Comrat, 
otherwise no donor organisations were present. Most of the financial support 
came from abroad, 80 per cent of grants were made directly, and contact 
with civil society in Chisinau was not too strong.
261 Freedom of speech existed 
and, as shown in the aftermath of the last Bashkan election, demonstrations 
took place. However, the general political culture and understanding of 
certain norms were not very high.
262  
Civil society representatives were not aware of any special institution 
dealing with human rights in Gagauzia, and if there was an ombudsman’s 
office in Comrat, it was obviously not very visible and well known.
263 Reports 
showed that corruption in Gagauzia had similar traits to that in the rest of 
the country, except for the ‘leader Chisinau’, and in some areas 
(bureaucratic burden, bribery) rated quite high on a national level.
264  
The police was not under society’s control; in combination with weak 
courts, corruption was frequent. To open a shop in a village, one would have 
to ‘arrange himself’ with the local authorities, and to simply sell products in 
the bazar in Comrat required an additional, unofficial payment. It was 
possible to talk and write about these things, but everybody was well aware 
of the situation. Many people had Bulgarian and/or Romanian passports - it 
was not hard to present appropriate proof to obtain citizenship in the 
neighbouring countries.
265  People saw the permanent fights between the 
executive and legislative, how abnormal their dialogue was, and therefore 
had no trust in the court system. They were tired, passive and did not believe 
in change. During elections, fraud through multiple voting was frequent, and 
people that participated did so for money. At the same time, there were not 
many seminars to educate citizens about their rights.
266  During the pre-
election period in Gagauzia in 2012 it also became obvious that the civil 
society in the autonomy was weak and could not take civil control over 
ongoing processes.
267 However, election observation activities and reporting 
took place by local NGOs.
268 
 
 
261  Vitali Burlaca.  
262  Mihail Sirkeli. He mentioned as an example that the candidate that had officially lost the elections 
had not even prepared a proper appeal against the result and could hardly present any proof for his 
accusations in order to repeat the vote. 
263  Vitali Burlaca; Mihail Sirkeli. The general opinion was that such an office would also not be much 
trusted by people. 
264  Transparency International – Moldova, “Corruption and Tax Evasion: Economic Dimension”, (2003), 
at http://transparency.md/Docs/cor_evaz_fisc_en.pdf. Telephone interview with Carasciuc Lilia (of 
Transparency International – Moldova; 20 July 2011 – Chisinau). 
265  This was also observed by Hatlas and Zyromski, Power, Administration and Ethnic Minorities …, 47. 
266  Round-up of opinions with a few citizens in Gagauzia, speaking on the basis of anonymity. They 
asked to not be named as this form of criticism was not well perceived in the autonomy. 
267  Kommersant.md,  “Выборочное  законодательство”  [Electoral  Legislation],  23  May 2012, at 
http://www.kommersant.md/node/8198. 
268  Pilgrim-Demo Youth Centre conducted an election observation and produced corresponding reports. 
Materials were provided by the NGO to the author on 16 September 2012 by email and can be found Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia 
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3.2. Conclusion 
No armed confrontations have been documented since the birth of the ATU 
Gagauzia in 1994. The elite of the country and its population still support the 
existence of this territorial solution to accommodate the Gagauz’ demands 
and acknowledge a certain degree of self-rule for them. 
The expert discussions and analysis of existing sources about the state of 
the autonomy revealed many negative aspects: of a number of issues that 
were deemed problematic or disputed in previous years until a new 
government came into power in Chisinau in 2009, only the topic of 
privatization appears to be off the table because this process is considered to 
be finished. However, most other aspects that have dominated the 
discussions between Comrat and Chisinau, or were identified by scholars to 
be/come problematic, remain unresolved in 2012. Among the main stumbling 
blocks are: 
•  The lack of dialogue and reform perspectives, including on the legal 
framework, because of a mix of political interests, ignorance and 
scarce resources; 
•  The missing capacities and inefficient use of existing mechanisms – 
either in the People’s Assembly concerning legal initiatives, or in the 
government by not perceiving the Bashkan as an equal player; 
•  The sticking to old political agendas and promoting unrealistic goals; 
•  The low incentives and support for integration, especially in terms 
of education and language; 
•  The insufficient protection and promotion of the Gagauz culture and 
language by Chisinau as well as Comrat;  
•  The absence of a clear, transparent, timely and corresponding 
budget formation and distribution process; 
•  The potential changes to the territorial arrangement of Gagauzia 
and the possibility of future conflicts due to attempts to increase 
centralization. 
While a peaceful coexistence in Moldova and within Gagauzia can be 
observed, the lack of development of their native Gagauz language shows 
that the level of protection of the ethno-cultural identity of the Gagauz is not 
high  –  it might even be fair to say that it will be under threat if no 
fundamental steps are taken. Discrimination in the country is not directly 
against the Gagauz; however, they have fewer chances in the education 
system due to entry barriers linked to the knowledge of the state language. In 
addition, it seems that there is, to a large extent, popular support for the 
dominant role of the Russian language in the autonomy. 
The unity of Moldova was preserved through the autonomy solution, but a 
number of aspects raise doubts that a significant level of self-rule was 
 
 
at  http://www.e-democracy.md/files/elections/gagauzia2012/report-piligrim-demo-elections-
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achieved. From a legal perspective, the hierarchy of laws - even if considered 
clear by some experts - remains disputed, and the state authorities continue 
to ignore the Autonomy Statute. Gagauzia keeps on ignoring certain 
provisions of the Constitution and refrain from updating its own legislative 
framework. On the one hand, a lack of capacity on both sides might be a 
problem, such as a degree of ignorance, but resistance towards perceived 
interference and control from the centre is also apparent in Comrat. While 
consensus exists in the expert community and among political representatives 
of different backgrounds that a dialogue is missing and that the current 
situation should not continue, mechanisms to break the deadlock are not 
used, are inappropriate or simply missing. One of the main problems of the 
1994 Law is the fact that a facilitation organ was not included: it could play a 
role in reforming the arrangements and encouraging political actors to engage 
in dialogue and come to solutions, even through informal ways. As the case of 
the university entry exams in summer 2011 showed, after the Bashkan and the 
Prime Minister met to discuss this issue – preceded by confrontational politics, 
orchestrated via the media – a temporary solution was found. While this is a 
positive sign, the underlying structural problem was not tackled, and a similar 
situation might arise in the future. It also appears that the long practice of 
“salami tactics”
269  aimed at reducing the scope of the autonomy is still 
followed as the General Prosecutor’s initiative has shown. 
In Chisinau, the position remains that the Gagauz elite are unable to raise 
the level of the autonomy and visibly improve the protection of their culture 
and language. Officially, Gagauzia was fully integrated and as long as it did 
not pose any problems it would be considered an ‘exemplary solution’.
270 
However, the incentives for the autonomy to integrate in the state remain at 
a minimum level, and it raises the question as to whether this is a specific or 
a general phenomenon concerning other regions of the country. But even if 
so, by agreeing to grant the autonomy, the Republic of Moldova took over 
some obligations and the political compromise of 1994 demanded concrete 
steps from central authorities, which so far have not been taken. Rather than 
understanding the arrangement as a reform process and chance to prove that 
Moldova can accommodate its minorities appropriately, the approach towards 
the south gives the impression that the autonomy is to some extent only 
existent on paper or treated according to a feudal model. Another relevant 
aspect, as other scholars foresaw, is the recovery of the central state: it 
seemingly made the authorities less willing to cede control through the 
 
 
269  Protsyk and Rigamonti, “Real and ‘Virtual’ Elements …”, 8–10. 
270  A typical official position was, for instance, displayed by Elena Beleacova, Director General of the 
Office of Interethnic Relations of Moldova: when asked by UN experts as head of the delegation 
about the possibility of Gagauz integrating into Moldovan society, she gave the following reply:  
“The delegation said the autonomy granted to Gagauz was the most effective solution arrived at for 
the problems faced by its people. The Gagauz were fully integrated in Moldovan political and social 
life as their  elected authorities were full members of the Moldovan executive and legislative 
bodies.” The delegation stated that there was no segregation in relation to the Gagauz. OHCHR, 
“Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Considers Report of the Republic of Moldova”, 2 
March 2011, at http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10790&La. Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia 
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institutionalization of the autonomy.
271 The growing tax collecting and service 
delivery capacities of the Moldovan state, however, contribute little to 
empower the autonomy.
272 
A clear demand, as well as a potential obstacle for integration, is the need 
for knowing the state language; if enough resources and opportunities were 
offered to the Gagauz to enable them to learn Moldovan, the discussion of 
why they would not want to do so would be different. Currently, the situation 
does not support such any developments and it is striking to see that no 
improvements have been reached in the past 20 years. Likewise, it would 
strengthen the position of the central authorities and mean a further 
consolidation of the country if the state followed its commitment as 
stipulated in the 2001 Law of the Republic of Moldova on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National Minorities and the Legal Status of their Organizations 
(Chapter II, Article 5, Point 1), that it “assumes the obligation to facilitate 
the creation of necessary conditions for the persons belonging to national 
minorities be able to preserve, develop and express their ethnical, cultural, 
linguistic and religious identities”.
273  
If the Republic of Moldova provided enough support or at least 
communicated a clear commitment to help the Gagauz develop their mother 
tongue, this distrust could be limited or even be eliminated, with the 
additional benefit of lowering Russian dominance in the region – which is a 
clear objective of the current (and previous) governments in power. The most 
contentious issues in past years, which are still a problem for relations 
between Comrat and Chisinau and bear substantial potential for conflict, are 
the budget formation and the territorial arrangement of the region. The 
financial question is used informally to exert control and stress the 
autonomy’s dependence, which poses risks to good governance and does not 
raise sympathies towards the centre. In general, the spirit of the autonomy 
agreement, such as its content, speak against treating the ATU like a normal 
district – even though some of the problems Gagauzia is facing can be found 
in surrounding districts as well. The territorial set-up of the autonomy can be 
changed through referendums as stipulated by law and clarified by the 
Constitutional Court, but there are indications that Chisinau is against using 
this option. Clearly, therefore, the Moldovan state has to resolve the issues at 
stake that concern local communities and that appear, at least in part, to be 
matters of administrative changes, otherwise the shape of Gagauzia will de 
facto and at some point de jure be subject to enlargement. As this would 
involve mainly Bulgarian and Moldovan villages, this could also imply  new 
dynamics within Gagauz Yeri itself.  
If the capital spares Comrat from the ongoing centralization drive and 
respects its special status, then increased integration within Europe will also 
imply more opportunities for Gagauzia. Among the positive factors having the 
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potential to influence this state–autonomy relationship, EU integration is 
clearly the greatest, and can rely on growing trust and support in the 
autonomy. The real influence of Turkey and the Russian Federation, in 
addition to their financial aid, is based on many years of support and 
sentiments. In particular, the popularity of pan-Slavic political programmes 
and attitudes imply that the Soviet identity is still the strongest in Gagauzia. 
A continued opening up of the region and perspectives  for transborder 
cooperation might also bring a slow challenge to this manifested identity. 
An interesting perspective in the expert talks were the differing attitudes 
and proposals by the MPs of Gagauz origin, whose criticism, though certainly 
not free from political party considerations, was mainly directed at their 
fellow colleagues in power in Comrat. While parts of the Gagauz elite do not 
want to perceive those MPs as representatives of the autonomy, they could 
be challenged further to step forward for the rights of their fellow people. 
The question remains if the chance to form parties in Gagauzia as an 
exception would foster integration in the political life of Moldova, and if this 
helped to structure the political process in the autonomy. At the same time, 
the ongoing mobilization to influence decision-making via regional parties 
with a strong Gagauz component could be an interesting contribution to 
democratic processes in the country.  
The role and responsibilities of the state - even though weak and faced 
with economic difficulties -  towards the territorial autonomy cannot be 
stressed enough; but also the political representatives of Gagauzia cannot 
reject their duties and role in the continuing standstill. Frustrations are high 
and the initial hopes for improved cooperation after the change in power in 
the capital appear to be quite diminished, whereas the elites in Comrat have 
not contributed positively to any substantial improvements recently. Elites 
are caught in internal struggles and infighting that prohibits even the 
adoption of laws on an autonomy level and partially infringed the holding of 
local elections. Furthermore, personal politics and certain populism, like 
unrealistic demands and laws, are the dominating factors in local politics.  
Some of the mechanisms in place to give the Gagauz a voice in decision-
making in the centre are not working. In this respect it should also be 
reflected upon what the ex officio government position of the Bashkan gives 
to the autonomy if it retains a rather symbolic value. Opportunities such as 
the legal initiative right are not used to their fullest, if at all, and the 
question arises as to how far cooperation and communication with the centre 
is really on the agenda of local elites. The latter should not refrain from 
finding solutions by working together with international actors but should 
utilize the chance to set a new imperative to the 1994 Law. There is a valid 
argument, as well as a legitimate wish, to professionalize the official 
structures of the ATU, especially the People’s Assembly. 
There are some proposals for improvements and the core of the problems 
seems clear, but cooperation from the autonomy’s authorities and more 
pragmatism, as well as clear action, for the support of the Moldovan state are 
needed. With respect to the renewed transformation processes in the 
country, with a president having been elected in March 2012 and the positive Wöber – The Autonomy of Gagauzia 
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cooperation with the EU, now it might be time for the Gagauz elite to reflect 
upon old demands (such as Russian as a state language and calls for 
federalization) and to update its agenda to positively contribute to the 
state’s future challenges.  
According to Webster, the country learned from the parliamentary 
deadlocks that occurred in 1988 to 1995 and thereafter made institutional 
changes that strengthened the majority party. The final result of this process 
was the creation of a parliamentary system in 2000. The “impressive 
resolution of the Gagauz question” serves also as evidence that the country 
was resisting moves towards a more authoritative regime.
274  This follows 
academic findings that “autonomous bodies can play a significant role in 
shaping and restructuring internal political and administrative 
mechanisms”.
275 In one expert talk, it was mentioned that the Gagauz play, 
and could do so even more intensively, a role in relations with Turkey and 
also in relations with Russia.
276 Besides these two aspects – the historic role in 
shaping the state’s build-up and in fostering relations with Turkey, and 
(potentially) the Russian Federation – Gagauzia has played a minor role in 
state-building in Moldova. When it comes to a solution for the Transnistrian 
conflict, the autonomy will wake up again and will have to be taken into 
account for potential changes of the Constitution, otherwise conflict is 
unavoidable. It seems too late to present Gagauzia as a functioning model to 
the Transnistrian elite; but it would only bear positive aspects if an ongoing 
development of Moldova, in economic, juridical and democratic terms, had 
an impact on the autonomy as well and respected, rather than ignored, its 
opinion in issues of direct concern. The autonomy has closed the first chapter 
of a secessionist conflict in a peaceful way, but if the Gagauz are not taken 
on board in relation to European integration, further demands to enforce self-
determination could pose a new obstacle for state-building efforts in 
Moldova.  
From a rather feudal interpretation of this autonomy, both from a Chisinau 
–  Comrat as well as internal Comrat perspective, Gagauzia could at some 
point have the potential to develop into a regional autonomy.
277 Interpreted 
and used in a positive sense as a changing, flexible concept, combined with 
strong rules of law that are clearly established and based on democratic 
principles, that would mean a maximum autonomy level and a wide range of 
external competencies – something the Gagauz are increasingly developing. 
The key conditions in Danspeckgruber’s concept, the “acceptance of multiple 
identities” as well as a flexible political culture,
278 to some extent already 
exist in Gagauz Yeri, and would be further encouraged by transborder 
 
 
274  Webster, Parliamentary Majorities …, 275–278.  
275  Gnanapal Welhengama, Minorities Claims: From Autonomy to Secession: International Law and 
State Practice (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2000), 169. 
276  Igor Botan.  
277  As described by Wolfgang F. Danspeckgruber, “Self-Governance plus Regional Integration”, in Marc 
Weller and Stefan Wolff (eds.), Autonomy, Self-Governance and Conflict Resolution: Innovative 
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activities and regional integration –  a process that seems to be in 
development, despite obvious concerns by central authorities. 
The formula of the “functioning of the Gagauz autonomy as an indicator of 
maturity of the Moldovan state”
279  will thereby still be valid and the 
authorities in Moldova, as well as in Gagauzia, will further be judged by their 
actions in the years to come. If the full political spectrum of the country 
agrees that the autonomy is an irreversible process that always considers the 
special rights and demands of the minority with whom an agreement had 
been reached, and the Gagauz elite likewise show openness for reform and 
consider the position of the rest of the country more seriously, the basis for a 
new dialogue would exist. As a living autonomy, Gagauzia could potentially 
bring good to the Republic of Moldova. 
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